Transatlantic Policy Memorandum
“We are the first generation to feel the effect of climate change and the last generation who can do something about it.”
-Barack Obama, Former US President
Introduction
Written by Rebecca Slavik
Over the last decade the transatlantic order has been challenged with a host of varying geopolitical concerns but one issue in particular continues to rise to the fore at an alarming pace with little sign of slowing: climate change.
It is a high-impact, high-probability phenomenon which has quickly become a chief anxiety among leaders on both sides of the transatlantic, particularly as its disastrous effects begin to worsen and directly impact everyday lives. The governments of the US and EU have begun working together to collectively combat this challenge as evidenced by the 2015 signing of the Paris Climate Accords and their frequent leading roles at The UN Climate Change conferences. As climate change begins to adversely affect international partners, weaken economies, and harm internal stability, it is critical that the US and EU remain steadfast in their commitments to reduce carbon emissions, promote innovative green technologies, and build a proactive climate-friendly framework for the greater international community to adopt. In today’s globalized society reaching these critical goals will require dramatic systemic change and large financial investments that can only be effective through a united effort that has both the US and EU at its helm.
While both the US and EU have made considerable strides regarding Green Deal policies, the importance of ensuring that the changes being made are equitable and fair. This concept of social intervention being intertwined within the fabric of sustainable transformation policies is known as a “just transition” framework. Specifically, “just transition” frameworks look at the ways in which climate change can be combated while also advocating for the welfare of vulnerable populations most impacted by the new policies. Meaningful acknowledgement of “just transition” language on the global stage really began at the COP21 in 2015 where it was included in the Paris Agreement’s preamble and has since taken on greater international weight. Across the globe, communities most affected by carbon neutral transitions are playing a more important role in climate change dialogues, which is increasingly being reflected in transatlantic Green Deal strategies.
This transatlantic policy memorandum explores the salient topic of “just transitions”. It seeks to recontextualize the “just transition” concept beyond a mere “buzz word” and into an understandable factor that must be incorporated in future sustainability policies. It is not enough to phase out coal and fossil fuels, rather, the US and EU, as early industrial giants, owe it to populations disproportionately affected by climate change to craft policy which shifts away from the harmful use of coal in a way that does not uproot the population’s economic structure or place an undue burden upon them to transition. Transatlantic actors must work together to share the burden of climate mitigation in the least invasive way to vulnerable groups already suffering from the former’s over-reliance on non-renewable resources and harmful ecological practices. This memo acknowledges climate change as a global phenomenon which affects pockets of the world differently.
What the “new normal” of disastrous weather patterns exacerbated by global warming looks like in the US may manifest quite differently in Germany, for example. Regardless, understanding these differences and the unique domestic concerns coupled with them is important to the crafting of actionable green policies. The US and EU can continue to lead the way forward on climate mitigation strategies only by understanding the intersectional impacts these new policies will have on marginalized communities, both at home and abroad,
and utilize this understanding to craft purposeful, transformative legislation that mitigates undue burdens on the most vulnerable.
A “just transition” framework is a vital element of producing equitable policy to combat climate change in the 21st century. While at times complicated due to the interweaving factors, “just transition” must be understood by transatlantic partners and take a foundational role in the next step of shaping future green strategies and building upon the critical strides already taken.
2. Relevance for the Transatlantic Order
Written by Guillaume Lienart
Scientists have studied the anthropogenic nature of climate change for decades, however, climate change has only recently started being addressed by politicians. The main cause of this sudden interest is largely due to the fact that the consequences of inaction are now beginning to affect everyday life in both the US and the EU.
2.1 Domestic Impacts on the US
The average temperature in the US has increased by over 1.0°C (1.8°F) from 1901 to 2016 and is expected to rise by another 1° in the next few years. This has already threatened the US in the following ways:
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● Coastal Floodings: Coastal flooding incidents have accelerated in more than 25 Atlantic/Gulf Coast cities due to changes in the earth’s gravitational fields caused by melting ice caps.
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● Larger Precipitation Events: Heavy precipitation is increasing in intensity and frequency across the US. Although seemingly harmless, heavier precipitation can be dangerous for populations and infrastructure
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● Heatwaves: Heatwaves have become more frequent in the last few years and can stand as a danger to the agricultural sector. They also increase the risk of forest fires. The 2021 California Wildfires, for example, were caused by historically low rainfall during a period of unusually long drought that most scientists attribute to climate change.
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● Hurricanes: Scientists expect an increase in tropical cyclone frequency and intensity in the near future. These can cause devastating damage on human life and infrastructure.
In addition to the physical impacts, climate change also severely affects the political landscape and economy. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) climate risk subcommittee has warned that, “Climate change poses a major risk to the stability of the US financial system and its ability to sustain the US economy.” These risks would mainly be price inflation in the industrial market which would possibly spillover in other aspects of the financial system. Global temperature change also affects agricultural yields as well as the health sector because of the threats to human livelihoods. In addition, the process of climate change mitigation stresses the real estate sector as it requires the infrastructure to be more climate resilient and drives up the price levels. Both the process of climate change mitigation and the direct effects of climate change would stress the US financial system by ‘’limiting the availability of credit, and reducing access to certain financial products.’’ By affecting different aspects of the economy, climate change becomes a threat to the entire US financial system.
Notably, in the recent political climate of the US, conversation has also shifted towards a greater focus on the relationship of systemic racism and its link to the US economy. With climate change disproportionately affecting low-income communities of color, issues must now be viewed through an intersectional lens that highlights how these factors interact with one another. Therefore, for the US to maintain a “just transition”, it would need to address both problems in tandem.
This overarching topic of climate change has greatly deepened the already polarized US political divide between Republicans and Democrats. Republicans nowadays tend to be associated with climate change denial. Former President Donald Trump famously touted climate change as a “Chinese hoax.” Apart from conspiracy theories, Republicans' more practical arguments focus on the threat that effective climate action would pose to the US economy. In fact, this argument is often cited as a major deterrence to climate change mitigation regardless of their inner beliefs. The interests of major fuel companies are still an important element of Republican discourse, particularly as it relates to voters living in state economies dependent on fossil fuel industries such as Wyoming, West Virginia, Louisiana, and Alaska. The combination of conspiracy theories downplaying or blatantly denying the existence of climate change work alongside these economic fears to produce an electorate that tends towards an anti-elite, anti-science rhetoric which creates an increasingly hostile landscape for effective climate change policy to exist within. A “just transition” therefore has to contend with these factors and address the average Republican voter’s scientific skepticism and economic concerns. With Americans seeing party identification as a vital social identity wherein the opposing party is to be viewed with increasing hostility, the subject of climate change worsens this already deepening divide and subsequently heightens the hostility between supporters of each party.
2.2 Domestic Impacts on the EU
The temperature in Europe has also risen by 1.9°C (3.4°F) since pre-industrial levels, making it the warmest era on record. Despite mitigation efforts, some effects of climate change can already be observed.
- Heatwaves and Floods: Within the EU heatwaves and floods have increased in frequency and intensity due to the rise in temperature. The severe heatwaves of 2003 alone were the hottest in Europe since the 1500s. Heatwave-related deaths have also grown in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain while climate models show that even in low impact scenarios, drought conditions will continue to intensify in southern European cities. This is only worsened by the reality that river flooding in northern European cities will see exacerbation as well.
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Sea Level Rise: The sea level is expected to rise 40 centimeters (15 inches) by the year 2100. This will drastically affect the European coastline, particularly in the Netherlands, Greece, and Italy. Preparedness for this rise varies, countries like the Netherlands are well prepared as they have faced the threat of flooding before, but for others, it will be an unexpected extra cost that has the potential to be a severe threat to the economy.
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Biodiversity and Disease: In 2019 the Zika virus was first diagnosed in Europe not by a traveler from a tropical country but by a local mosquito. This was a direct effect of global warming which allowed disease-carrying mosquitoes to inhabit areas where they normally would not. Even though the Zika virus is treatable, our rapidly changing environment may present the emergence of new viruses and mutations.
Similar to the US, climate change discourse is also affecting the political landscape of Europe. Although it is more complicated to broadly discuss polarization at the European level, there are still climate skeptics in several notable European political parties. The German party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for example, claims that climate action is a mass hysteria designed to deindustrialize Germany. Other European countries have also seen climate skeptics become increasingly popular even in countries which are otherwise staunch climate change advocates such as Denmark and Sweden. Even though literature on the intersections between populism and climate action is a more recent phenomenon, climate change can be “an ideal target for the populist agenda” according to researchers who have studied this intersection. Because climate change is seen as an elite driven movement that opposes a governmental elite to the population. Although the exact definition of “elite’’ and ‘the people’ is debated in the literature on populism, populist parties can present climate change mitigation policies as restrictive, as an attack on individual freedom, or as a loss of sovereignty. This anti-elite rhetoric is key to the populist political discourse.
For both the US and EU, the impacts of climate change have already proven to be a threat to livelihoods, economies, and to some extent governmental stability. Therefore, when considering a “just transition”, measures should be taken in coordination with one another and be sure to address both mitigation of current impacts, particularly when they affect lower income communities and the financial system, to avoid further worsening the political divide exacerbated by the populist rhetoric on climate change. In addition to preparation for future anticipated threats in the form of collective reduction of carbon emissions. Effective climate action requires close coordination among member states within strong supranational institutions. Even if the EU as an institution manages to create effective climate change action on its own, it will be meaningless without the cooperation of other international actors.
2.3 The West and the Rest
Written by Alexandre Neuville
The anthropogenic nature of climate change is attributed predominantly to western industrial nations, however, its impacts are global. This creates an uneven discourse between the Global West and the Global South, as the latter is predicted to pay the price of climate change without having contributed proportionally to the problem, further deepening divides between the two.
2.3.1 The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle
At the 1992 Rio Conference, the first international climate treaty was signed to provide a framework for future climate discussions. It incorporated an essential and still controversial premise and recognized that nations' historical obligations for emissions differed, as did their ability to reduce them in the future. These large historical emitters are referred to as the Global North, mainly composed of industrialized economies, and responsible for the majority of historical emissions. The Global North agreed that it had to enact measures globally and to cut emissions quickly. The US is one of these countries, having released more carbon than any other country to date and accounting for 25% of all historical emissions. The EU's twenty-seven countries and the United Kingdom follow them, accounting for 22% of world CO2 emissions. While poorer countries, considered as the Global South, deal with climate-related environmental shocks and have to bear a greater share of the burden of climate change's effects without having contributed to it.
2.3.2 EU/US Involvement in the Global Climate Community During the 21st Century
In the US, climate change mitigation has been and remains one of the most divisive policy issues among the two domestic political parties. During the early 2000s, the Bush administration was inactive and even denied the issue of climate change leaving the EU to salvage the Kyoto Protocol on its own. In 2009, at the Copenhagen Conference, the EU was not able to speak as a singular voice which forced member states to speak for themselves and symbolized that the EU had lost the recognition it had obtained during the Kyoto Protocol as a leader in negotiating climate mitigation agreements. The re-engagement of the US within international climate politics under then-US President Barack Obama contributed to the EU’s loss of leadership. This was because the US utilized the coalition BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) to avoid binding midterm emissions reduction targets that large emitters did not want to reach nor would have been able to, a direct consequence of the US’s long-term climate change denial. Nowadays, the Biden administration is confronted with a similar problem with four years of US absence from the global climate community which has left a significant gap in international leadership and credibility. Currently, the EU only accounts for 8% of global emissions, which now limits the EU to make an impact internally. This is why the EU is anticipated to help and assist non-EU countries to transit away from carbon. Europe’s priority is to avoid a return to the days of the Copenhagen Conference, when climate geopolitics were driven by coalitions between the US and BASIC countries. While the US’ current policies are driven by domestic short-term options that support climate action, long-term options like low-emission transportation regulations and clean energy development are still out of reach.
2.3.3 Contemporary Challenges and “Just Transition”
The COP26 in Glasgow allowed for the Global North (EU and US included) to acknowledge that the process towards an environmentally sustainable economy should include the support of developing countries and emerging economies. Specifically, this “just transition” dialogue focuses on including access to modern technologies, capacity building and finance, as well as policy solutions that assure fairness and inclusivity. However, much criticism has been made by the Global South about being constrained to adapt to the standards of the Global North, which impedes their economic development in trying to meet the criteria of green transitions. This has been referred to by some scholars as a form of neo-colonialism Therefore, the “common but differentiated” responsibility system becomes increasingly irrelevant as the blame for emissions can be attributed to many different countries, which therefore moves away from principles of fairness and global justice. From a universalist perspective, a “just transition” would refer to pragmatic decisions emphasizing the protection of climate vulnerable assets and front-line communities and should target climate forcing assets which are harmful to the environment rather than pointing out who is to be blamed for historical and current emissions.
3. Joint Actions and Divergences in Promoting a “Just Transition” With Transatlantic Actors
Written by Ava Rachel Stieb
For years the importance of a “just transition” has been emphasized on the international political stage. At COP21 in Paris on December 12, 2015, for example, the 196 signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement underscored the interconnectedness of climate action, sustainable development, and a “just transition” by stating in the agreement's preambles that all parties are, “taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities.” With the 2015 Guidelines for a Just Transition, the International Labour Organization (ILO) provided a global understanding of the term “just transition” and described it as a process towards a “competitive, low-carbon, environmentally sustainable economy and patterns of sustainable consumption and production” that, if well managed, can make transitions to environmentally and socially sustainable economies a “strong driver of job creation, job upgrading, social justice and poverty eradication.” At the last UN Climate Summit (COP26) held in Glasgow in November 2021, all 27 EU member states, as well as the US, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and New Zealand signed the Just Transition Declaration, committing them all to phase out coal and transition to greener economies while also ensuring that communities, workers, and businesses in coal producing regions receive sufficient support. The official goal of “leaving no one behind” in the transition to a carbon-neutral and climate- resilient future now needs to be implemented at the state-level.
Under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen (2019-2024), the European Commission presented the European Green Deal, which aims at achieving EU-wide climate neutrality by 2050. In order to reach this objective of climate neutrality in an effective and fair manner, the European Commission has created the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) to mobilize around €55 billion to the most affected regions over the period 2021-2027, thereby providing targeted support for local people and businesses and mitigating the socio-economic impacts of transition. This Just Transition Mechanism is financed through three pillars: 1.) the Just Transition Fund, which primarily provides grants, 2) the InvestEU programme, a dedicated scheme which crowds in private investments, and 3.) the European Investment Bank (EIB), a public sector loan facility which mobilizes additional investments in the regions concerned.
Which EU member states can benefit from the funds is determined through territorial “just transition” plans, in which individual member states work closely with the Commission to identify regions most affected by this transition to sustainable energy production and its respective hurdles. They also look at any developmental needs and goals that must be attained by their planned 2030 target. The nature of planned actions and governance mechanisms are also defined in this framework. EU countries and regions are supported by the Just Transition Platform, which acts as a single access point and help desk where authorities and beneficiaries can read up on information about the various funds, including relevant regulatory updates or sector-specific initiatives. Moreover, the platform supports and actively encourages the exchange of best practices among all stakeholders involved, for instance through regular in- person and virtual meetings.
In the US, President Biden signed the Executive Order 14008, “Taking the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad”, on January 27, 2021, which establishes an Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization. This Interagency Working Group is administered by the Secretary of Energy and co-chaired by the Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) and the National Climate Advisor. The Executive Order signed by Biden directed the Interagency Working Group to write an initial report detailing, “all mechanisms, consistent with applicable law, to prioritize grantmaking, Federal loan programs, technical assistance, financing, procurement, or other existing programs to support and revitalize the economies of coal and power plant communities, and providing recommendations for action consistent with the goals of the Interagency Working Group.” This report identifies resources available for immediate deployment, including $38 billion in existing federal funding set aside for infrastructure, environmental remediation, union job creation, and community revitalization efforts in energy communities. Notably it also highlights urgent-need geographic areas which are severely impacted by either past mine and plant closures or are at risk of further closures and therefore need to be prioritized for this
investment and engagement. Lastly, the report also sets out the next steps for the Working Group to further the Biden administration’s long-term commitment to support energy communities and workers. In addition to the $38 billion already available, the Department of Energy (DOE) has added $109.5 million to support innovative projects designed to help maintain or create jobs in energy (next-generation) communities, such as projects on carbon capturing and geothermal research.
In comparison, the EU is currently spending more money on a “just transition”. However, it should be noted that other funds such as the Just Transition Fund, established by the Rockefeller Family Fund (RFF) and the Appalachian Funders Network (AFN) in response to former President Obama's POWER Initiative, exist in the US to help those communities most impacted by the changing coal economy and energy sector.
4. Mitigating Intra-European Differences and Transatlantic Divergences
Written by Anna-Loreen Mondorf
In face of fundamental market and policy divergences both within and between the EU and US, structural policy changes are required to make both carbon-neutral transitions not only green, but also socially just. The latter is particularly relevant with regards to the adverse socio- economic effects of the systemic transformation towards climate-neutrality, considering that particularly low-income households and vulnerable communities face disproportionate burdens. Adverse market effects include labor disruptions, increasing energy costs, energy insecurity, and decreasing local tax revenues.
Whereas some EU member states, which are in competence of mitigating the transformation’s socio-economic effects on EU citizens, can build on a comprehensive, well-functioning social security net, others require further-reaching transitional policies to balance transitional asymmetries. The latter vary across regions, depending on how much local economies and job markets depend upon fossil fuels-based industries. “Just transition” strategies must therefore not only be seen in a broader policy context, but also take local realities and social security challenges inaccount.
German communities affected by the declining coal production, for instance, have already been supported by governmental action since 1968. Building on the expansive compensation mechanisms of its social welfare state and regional fiscal equalization system, Germany has followed a regionalized bottom-up approach since the 1980s. Proactive structural policies, such as large-scale investments and local stakeholder inclusion, successfully contributed to an anticipatory economic reorientation of former coal regions and an increasing integration of renewable energies as foreseen in the federal energy strategy. The former example underlines that ensuring an EU-wide “just transition” (paradoxically) requires further regionalization.
An overarching anticipatory strategy at EU level can help prevent internal market fragmentation by providing general guidelines and meta objectives while allowing transition projects to adapt to local realities simultaneously. “Just transition” policies should not only be anchored in the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) itself, but also holistically incorporated into the Social Climate Fund (SCF), Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The latters’ subsidies’ allocation may further build on the strategic priority corridors of the TEN-E Regulation, which aims at financially stimulating cross-border energy projects as “Projects of Common Interest” (PCIs) to increase the internal energy market’s economic integration, technical interconnection, and energy security – the economic and technical precondition of ensuring cross-border environmental justice.
Despite limited EU competence in climate, energy, and social policy, the Green Deal already acknowledges the importance of local stakeholder inclusion, particularly in the form of Energy
Communities. In this light, consultation mechanisms and increased local cooperation across member states with similar energy mixes, market structures, and challenges, can help further regionalizing and, thus, Europeanizing “just transition” policies.
In comparison, the US requires further-reaching structural policy measures considering that vulnerable communities are not only confronted with the systemic transformation’s adverse effects, particularly in the West, Midwest, and Appalachia, but also the lack of an overarching social security, health care, and job retraining system. As job loss generally leads to higher individual costs in the US than in Europe, vulnerable communities are exposed to free market forces. “Just transition” policies should therefore counterbalance the lack of a comprehensive social security net to mitigate adverse transitional effects across regions – not only to ensure distributional justice within society, but also to achieve long-term economic stability at the national level. In this light, the proactive structural reorientation of regions, which economically depend(ed) on fossil fuel industries, towards future-oriented energy sectors, such as hydrogen and renewable energies, contribute to economic growth and environmentally- sound energy security in the long-term.
The Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization, introduced by the Biden administration, is of importance in this context, as it focuses on mitigating socio-economic effects by supporting innovative “Energy Communities” across the country. The latter offers potential for inter-regional cooperation at both the national and transatlantic level – to reduce intra- and inter-state divergences, diversify energy sources, and accelerate energy transitions across borders. By adapting overarching just transition- strategies to local realities, the Green Deals become socially, economically, and environmentally more sustainable on both sides of the Atlantic.
5. Just Transition-Policy Recommendations
Recommendation No. 1: Accelerate the internal energy market’s harmonization and
electricity interconnection at EU level.
Accelerating the internal energy market’s integration and electricity interconnection is an
economic and technical precondition for creating a just and secure energy transition within the
EU. The revision of the TEN-E Regulation (EU) No. 347/2013 should adapt its financial means
and strategic trans-European energy corridor priorities to stimulate cross-border energy
projects as it will help in the technical achievement of the Green Deals’ socio-ecological
ambitions. The maximum project permission period within the PCI-framework should be
reduced (from 3.5 to 2 years) and permit-granting legislation EU-wide harmonized to facilitate,
hence stimulate and accelerate, cross-border infrastructural activity.
Recommendation No. 2: Develop regionalized structural policy strategies on both sides of the Atlantic.
Regionalized structural policy strategies are required on both sides of the Atlantic to mitigate socio-economic divergences, resulting from the adverse, unequally distributed effects of climate change and low-carbon transitions among regions and societal groups. Adapting transitional policies to local realities allow for local stakeholder inclusion, higher social acceptance, and regionally tailored transitions. Overarching just transition-strategies at the EU and US level should provide closely coordinated guidance, the financial means necessary, and aim at scaling up innovative, future-oriented energy sectors, such as renewable and hydrogen- based energies. Only the latter can promote long-term economic development opportunities for regions formerly dependent on fossil fuel industries.
Recommendation No. 3: Foster transatlantic dialogue through Energy Community partnerships.
Particularly the support of innovative and independent Energy Communities at the EU and US level offers potential for transatlantic cooperation at the local stakeholder level. Regular consultation mechanisms between regions, both within and between the EU and US, with similar energy mixes, market structures, and transitional challenges, can help further regionalize and accelerate “just transitions” across the Atlantic. Transatlantic partnership- agreements between comparable Energy Communities should be institutionally and financially supported under the EU-US Energy Council’s umbrella, steering transatlantic relations in a socially and environmentally sustainable future.
Recommendation No. 4: Increase public awareness of the importance of environmental action in the face of climate change.
The effects of climate change and its mitigation disproportionately affect marginalized and lower-income communities. Thus, harsher regulations and climate change mitigation measures would risk further worsening these conditions. As climate change is already a divisive subject, to prevent this, transatlantic partners should increase education and public awareness on a regional level. The main criticism of climate change mitigation is the perception of it being a potential loss of sovereignty of states to supranational institutions. In addition, climate change as an issue is distant, technical, and elite-driven. Thus, Education on climate change, its effects, and its mitigation must be greatly expanded in all education sectors. Governments should also expand upon their efforts in political communication on climate change In addition governments should subsidize the costs of climate mitigation, to prevent resentment towards strict governmental climate change mitigation policies.
Potential Specific Examples:
- Working with leading tech groups such as Facebook (META), Twitter, and Google to tighten restrictions on climate change denial and misinformation.
- Assist in creating age-appropriate regionalized frameworks for educators to better teach climate mitigation in classrooms with issue-specific materials related to their direct environment.
Subsidize transition costs for lower-income communities where it affects the affordability of real estate. In addition, provide job prospects and vocational subsidies for workers affected within the agricultural and industrial sectors.
Everyone loses in regard to global warming. Encouraging large-scale, visible opportunities for world leaders to highlight their efforts assists in the creation of a global standard that unifies rather than divides. China is far from a “developing nation” and has the capacity to be held responsible for its large contribution to carbon emissions. Rather than place blame on them as one of the largest polluters, emphasis should instead be placed on recognizing their current status as a global leader in climate mitigation dialogue. This then shifts the angle to one of friendlier partnerships and secures a commitment from China to follow through on joint- measures as it is now more present in these dialogues.
Recommendation No. 5: Encourage additional US-EU-China climate leadership conferences.Everyone loses in regard to global warming. Encouraging large-scale, visible opportunities for world leaders to highlight their efforts assists in the creation of a global standard that unifies rather than divides. China is far from a “developing nation” and has the capacity to be held responsible for its large contribution of carbon emissions. Rather than place blame on them as one of the largest polluters, emphasis should instead be placed on recognizing their current status as a global leader in climate mitigation dialogue. This then shifts the angle to one of friendlier partnerships and secures a commitment from China to follow through on joint- measures as it is now more present in these dialogues.
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