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Transatlantic Policy Memorandum
Nuclear Energy in the Climate Change Architecture: Convergence, Divergence, and Challenges in Transatlantic Relations
Marcel Bolboaca-Negru, Raquel Córdoba Rodríguez, Salome Dermati, Laura Dirix, Olivier P. van Vredendaal
Introduction - Raquel Córdoba Rodríguez
Climate change poses one of the biggest current global challenges and, as such, deserves to be addressed effectively within the Transatlantic area. Considering the established goal of transitioning to net-zero emissions by 2050, nuclear energy comes to play as a potential low- carbon source that allows countries to meet emission targets, overcome power supply outages and maintain competitive energy prices.
Nuclear power presents a clean and efficient way of boiling water to make steam, which, in turn, allows turbines to produce electricity (GEH, 2022). The production of nuclear power does not involve the burning of any fossil materials, and, as such, the provision of nuclear energy is linked to limited emissions of polluting greenhouse (Jin & Kim, 2018; Muellner et al., 2021; Saidi & Omri, 2020), helping to preserve air quality and, thus, contributing to climate change mitigation (GEH, 2022). Moreover, nuclear power is considered to be an efficient and reliable source of electricity, and nuclear power plants can continuously generate electricity on a large scale, without interruption, for many months (GEH, 2022).
In 2018, nuclear power provided about 10 percent of the world’s electricity (IAEA, 2022) and approximately 20 percent of the energy in the United States (GEH, 2022). Combined with carbon-free energy production from renewable sources, the role of the nuclear sector is relevant in cutting fossil fuel-powered plants such as coal. In addition, nuclear power can be used as a baseload that backs up renewables to guarantee that the electricity supply is constant, reliable, and dispatchable (NEA, 2021). While renewable energy resources may not fully meet current and future energy needs stemming from population growth and economic development, nuclear power could accommodate such demands (Sornette, et al., 2019).
The Transatlantic relationship in environmental, climate, and energy-related policy is multifaceted (Biedenkopf & Walker, 2018). Both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are considered key players in global environmental governance, but the US-EU interaction in environmental and climate policies has fluctuated from mutual influence and cooperation to divergence and conflict, depending on the policy area at stake and the ongoing domestic politics (Biedenkopf & Walker, 2018).
Relevance: The Merits of Approaching Contemporary Climate and Nuclear Energy Policy Using a Transatlantic Perspective - Olivier P. van Vredendaal
In recent years and decades, an array of threats confronting the world’s natural environment have garnered substantial public interest, and, consequently, the need to address current global climate risks, including those associated with the emission of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), has come to be understood by state and non-state actors alike (Bataille, 2022; Hegerl, 2022). In 2015, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) joined the international community in adopting the Paris Agreement, which aimed to limit global average temperature increases to less than two degrees Celsius (35.6 degrees Fahrenheit) and to arrive at net zero emissions (i.e., balancing the amount of greenhouse gasses emitted globally against the amount of such gasses removed from the atmosphere) by 2050 (Stern, 2018; Climate Council, 2018). However, US and EU climate policy priorities diverged when, in 2017, US President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement in favor of promoting the continued use of fossil fuels and undermining the regulatory foundations for ensuring domestic environmental protection (Petri & Biedenkopf, 2020; Bomberg, 2021), a move reversed by his successor, Joseph Biden, upon the latter’s ascension to the Presidency of the US in 2021. Meanwhile, the EU has continuously sought to play a central role in addressing climate change, both within Europe and globally, but whether it can succeed depends considerably upon EU Member States’ respective climate policy preferences (Roeben, 2018). Recent fluctuations in US climate policy and the US-EU rift they initially caused, combined with current hopes and doubts over the extent of future US climate leadership (Eichensehr, 2021; Smith, 2021) and the EU’s desire to shape the trajectory of global climate governance, highlight the merits of studying developments within the climate policy domain from a Transatlantic point of view.
Policies devised by the US and EU to protect the global climate (e.g., the US Congress- proposed Green New Deal, the European Commission’s European Green Deal) all integrate desires to limit the use of polluting fossil fuels (European Commission, 2019; Friedman, 2019; Toke et al., 2021). Nevertheless, to varying degrees, all such proposals have been met with and may face further skepticism (e.g., in the United States, from Congress and the judiciary; in the EU, from the individual Member States). All the while, pressures on the world’s climate have not diminished, and forecasts suggest that, if not constrained, the continued use of these fossil fuels will account for considerable pollution by the end of the current decade (Larsen et al., 2021).
In decreasing their reliance on fossil fuels, the US and the EU may avail themselves of the benefits associated with nuclear energy. Yet, nuclear power, lauded initially as a feat of technological ingenuity following the end of the Second World War (Josephson et al., 2021; Kaufman, 2012), does not currently enjoy the same reputation as it did in the past. If from the 1950s onwards, US and European actors advocated for including the atom in energy portfolios on both sides of the Atlantic (Thurner, 2017), many nowadays associate the provision of nuclear energy with the risks surrounding nuclear plants’ operational safety and the potentially devastating environmental impact of nuclear accidents (Müller & Thurner, 2017). Since the late 20th century, these public concerns have led various European states to shun nuclear energy (Aarts & Arentsen, 2017; Brouard & Guinaudeau, 2017; Cho, 2022; Dennison, 2022; Müller, 2017; Sonnberger et al., 2021; Thurner, 2017), and projections foresee a decline in the generation of nuclear energy from 2030 onwards (Boot, 2021). Across the Atlantic, in the US––which, with 93 nuclear reactors, boasts the world’s largest fleet of such facilities––the early 2010s saw the closure of various plants, including the high-production Indian Point plant in New York State, with further closures (e.g., of Diablo Canyon, California’s last remaining operational nuclear power plant) scheduled for the mid-2020s (Chu & Moniz, 2021; Mathews, 2021; McGeehan, 2021).
By turning to nuclear energy, the US and the EU could succeed in moving toward attaining their stated climate goals. Whether nuclear energy will be allowed to deliver on its potential hinges, however, on both actors’ ability to overcome numerous obstacles, as will be elaborated upon in greater detail in the remainder of this memorandum.
Areas of Divergence - Salome Dermati
In this section, three levels of divergence between the USA and the EU are examined: a) the input of nuclear energy to the energy mix, b) the contribution of nuclear energy to GHG emissions, and c) the public opinion. The first element is considered because of its implications for understanding the great picture of energy production and consumption patterns. The second one corresponds to the overarching topic of the memorandum at hand, that is, the relationship between nuclear energy and climate change. Lastly, the degree of public support, awareness, and salience of nuclear energy influence the decision-making process at multiple stages, from agenda-setting to implementation and evaluation.
Firstly, the EU draws its energy primarily from petrol (36 percent), natural gas (22 percent), renewables (15 percent), as well as from nuclear energy, and solid fossil fuels (13 percent each) (Eurostat, n.d.). Nuclear energy is more prominent in France and Sweden, representing 41 percent and 31 percent of the total energy, respectively in 2019, compared to the EU average of 13.1 percent; notably, 14 Member States do not have any nuclear power units (Ibid). On the whole, 103 nuclear power plants collectively produced 652.4 TWh in 2020 (World Nuclear News, 2022). The US similarly depends on petroleum and natural gas, although nuclear energy provided less than 10 percent of the total energy consumption in 2018 (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2020). Specifically, there are 55 active power plants across 28 states, most located along the East Coast and the Midwest; for instance, the largest unit is in Arizona (Energy Information Administration, 2022).
Regarding climate change, different economic sectors and activities are responsible for GHG emissions. According to 2019 figures, the EU emitted more in road transportation (27 percent), public electricity and heat production (25 percent) as well as in manufacturing and construction (15 percent) (Statista, 2021). In 2020 683.512 GWh of nuclear energy was produced for heating purposes, the vast majority of it coming from France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden (Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2022). However, the overall production rate has been slowly decreasing since the 2000s, for example, in the aforementioned countries, whereas Lithuania was the only state to close all operations in 2009 (Ibid). By contrast, in the US in 2020, electricity was responsible for roughly one-third of the total CO2 emissions, experiencing a significant increase from 25 percent in 2019 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2022); non-fossil fuels (nuclear energy and renewables) provided 43 percent of the total electricity (Energy Information Administration, 2021).
Thirdly, the general public's views on nuclear energy vary significantly both between and within the two sides of the Atlantic. Eurobarometer surveys have indicated that opinion is almost equally divided between supporting, opposing, or remaining neutral against the use of nuclear energy (OECD, 2010), although a simple majority prioritized the potential risks — namely vulnerability to terrorist attacks, toxic waste, and corruption — over benefits when directly confronted with such a dilemma (OECD, 2010). Nonetheless, there are more favorable expectations that nuclear power will surface as the third most important energy source in the near future in the EU, following solar and wind (OECD, 2010). By contrast, in the US, defending the employment or construction of new nuclear facilities to combat climate change is not a widely held conviction (OECD, 2010). According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, just one-third of American public opinion backs the proposal, whereas 37 percent are undecided (Leppert, 2022). Another survey highlighted a seemingly perfect split in 2019 on the question of generating nuclear energy for electricity, while in the past, attitudes have fluctuated in response to market and price chocks (World Nuclear News, 2019).
Recommendations - Marcel Bolboaca-Negru and Laura Dirix
The diverging attitudes and approaches—both perceived and real—of the US and EU to Climate Change may make achieving constructive cooperation in this field challenging (Carlarne, 2010). Especially building and operating nuclear power plants remains a debated topic embedded in discussions around national capacities and motivation, while potential (and lack thereof) also needs to be assessed in terms of international cooperation (Jewell et al., 2019).
Yet, a pathway for a renewal of transatlantic purpose to face the climate crisis presents itself, and the impetus for cooperation now is stronger than ever before (Lazard, 2021). To strengthen the Transatlantic approaches to contemporary climate issues using nuclear energy, we propose six recommendations focused on political, economic, and ideological levels.
• Recommendation # 1: the US and the EU should use the momentum to develop a new cooperative agenda (Van Schaik & Hofhuis, 2021) and foster a partnership based on co-benefits and global co-leadership in the area of climate change (Lazard, 2021). The transatlantic space plays a critical role in addressing the Climate Change Challenge (Schunz, 2022), as transatlantic partnership and cooperation are paramount in developing sustainable energy sources and technologies. Here, the US may sustain (and expand) its federal efforts toward combatting climate change, while the EU may, in turn, continue to carry out the various schemes devised by its institutions (e.g., the European Green New Deal).
• Recommendation # 2: EU-US should make progress on cooperation with China and other major GHG emitters/ third countries - beyond a possible G7 Climate club, it is important that the EU and the US reach out to China, as together they are the three largest GHG emitters accounting for 41.5 percent of total global emissions (Friedrich et al., 2020). Climate change presents a global, collective problem, which cannot be solved by one or multiple countries alone, and efforts toward climate change need to be taken, in differentiated ways, by every country (Petri & Biedenkopf, 2020). Insofar as divergent views held by the US and EU concerning the nature of the threat posed by China would allow, cooperation could materialize on a trilateral (EU-US-China) or bilateral basis (EU-China/ US-China) (Aktoudianakis et al., 2021). Working together concerning the global evaluation of nuclear new build projects could, for example, be a possible joint endeavor (Heffron, 2015).
• Recommendation # 3: communication and inclusive dialogue - both the US and EU currently face credibility-related challenges (e.g., concerning both actors' credibility as global leaders in addressing environmental threats), and both confront substantial degrees of domestic and regional societal polarization (e.g., in relation to the best approach to combatting climate change). Inclusive policy dialogues and appropriate communication concerning the need for a socially fair and just energy transition could be needed (Van Schaik & Hofhuis, 2021).
A three-pronged approach - communicate, educate, and advocate is critical for maintaining the momentum and minimizing some of the security concerns associated with nuclear power plants. First, a proactive media campaign that shows the benefits of nuclear energy and how this energy can be the needed solution to the climate efforts must begin immediately. In addition, legislators should welcome the scientific academia while addressing some of the security concerns, and the public opinion must be presented with relevant, accurate, and compelling arguments that strengthen the need to rely on nuclear energy as a mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
• Recommendation # 4: pave the way to establish a global price for carbon as this will persuade businesses to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and embrace the nuclear energy policies. To show true commitment to its climate goals, the United States should establish a national carbon price similar to the European Union model. At the same time, the EU should accelerate the existing Emissions Trading System (ETS) apparatus. Then, all Transatlantic actors should advocate in the international community to establish a global price for carbon as a mechanism to accelerate the green transition in the world. Nevertheless, one should be mindful of potential obstacles in establishing such a global regime, as it became clear to the G7, under its German presidency, that there is little consensus on how the architecture of the global price for carbon should look like (Martini & Görlach, 2022).
• Recommendation #5: include nuclear energy in all “Green Deal” efforts, which is a critical step, as it would allow the funding for new nuclear power plants. Currently, nuclear energy is not part of Ocasio-Cortez's “Green New Deal,” while the European regulators only last month proposed to include nuclear power as part of the EU’s commitment to multilateral climate diplomacy. However, it is expected that some EU Member States be reluctant to accept such a proposal, and the European Parliament must make a compelling case for advancing this proposal into legislation. All Transatlantic actors should actively advocate for the inclusion of nuclear energy in the fight to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the need to allocate funding for the building of new nuclear power plants.
• Recommendation # 6: adopt common regulation, taxation, and licensing – this common approach is required to minimize any legal concerns, address supply chain issues, and minimize the capital costs associated with the building of new nuclear power plants. Furthermore, this will encourage the export/import of knowledge, skills, and lessons learned, thus addressing the security risk concerns associated with the nuclear plants.
This non-comprehensive list of recommendations aligns with the Transatlantic commitments to fight climate change and provides the necessary starting point for mutual influence and cooperation in the nuclear energy sector.
While it is believed that nuclear energy could substantially contribute to mitigating climate change, reliance upon nuclear energy should not be absolute, nor should the potential renaissance of nuclear energy redirect investments away from truly renewable energy sources. Rather, in line with opinions voiced by international actors (e.g., the European Commission), an equal buildout of renewables should be undertaken in parallel.
In the end, the level of transatlantic commitment to the global public goodwill determines the success or failure of transitional and adaptive policies, which are crucial in facing the challenge of climate change (Lazard, 2021).
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