Section 1: The Issue
Author: Beth De Craen
At the start of the 21st century, Western countries realized that their security is not as secure as they thought, through multiple terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the Madrid bombing in 2004 and the London Underground attack in 2005. Afterwards, many counter-terrorism measures were taken by countries seperately, but also within the transatlantic cooperation. However, after the series of attacks in Europe in 2015-2017, the measures within the transatlantic cooperation were extensively increased (European Council, 2021).
The EU and US have both defined multiple pillars that support their fight against terror. For the US, these key pillars include understanding and sharing domestic terrorism-related information, preventing domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence, disrupting and detecting domestic terrorism activity, and confronting long-term contributors to domestic terrorism (The White House, 2021). Similarly, the EU has a four-pillar strategy in their combat against terrorism. These four pillars are anticipation of terrorist threats, prevention, protection and response to terrorist attacks (eurcrim, 2021).
Increasingly, both the EU and US have seen citizens returning from foreign countries where they radicalized towards the support of terrorist groups. Countering radicalization has since been one of the key areas in counter-terrorism response (European Council, 2021). Within the EU, this started with hawkful eyes on those returning from high risk countries. However, the development of Web 2.0 and the increase of social media use created a new path for terrorist groups to recruit within European countries (UNESCO, 2017). As a result, the EU approved a new legislation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online on April 29th, 2021. On top of that, the EU has multiple initiatives within Europol and other EU institutions that work on combating online radicalization (European Council, 2021).
Within the US, this issue is much more controversial. The US is incredibly set on freedom of speech and freedom of expression (Homeland Security, 2022). Due to this, regulations regarding restricting any online content are very limited. However, the US does recognize the use of internet and social media as a way to recruit followers of terrorist groups (Homeland Security, 2022). As such, one of their main goals has now also become countering radicalization online. As noted in the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (The White House, 2021b), the US recognizes the fundamental freedom of speech & expression, written down in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On the contrary, they do also acknowledge that violence and incitement to violence are not tolerated, nor protected by this fundamental freedom since it poses a threat to public safety, national security and the genuine free expression of ideas (The White House, 2021b).
Section 2: Relevance to the Transatlantic Order
Author: Bridget Ott
Radicalization leads to terrorism – a major security threat to all countries in the Transatlantic Order. Extremist groups begin the radicalization process by spreading disinformation, which LibertiesEU defines as “false information shared with the intention of misleading people”
(LibertiesEU, 2021). Disinformation is intentional and should not be confused with misinformation, or “misleading, inaccurate, or completely false information that is communicated without the explicit intent to deceive” the reader (LibertiesEU, 2021).
Preventing online radicalization is relevant to the Transatlantic Order because social media makes it easier for terrorists on both sides of the Atlantic to radicalize followers through disinformation. With 24/7 access to the Internet, terrorist organizations can broadcast information to social media outlets virtually anywhere in the world. While online radicalization occurs frequently in both right-wing and Islamic extremist groups, this memo will zoom in on right-wing radicalization.
In an interview with POLITICO, Joan Donovan – the research director at Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy – notes that social media algorithms are key to the radicalization process: “If I want to discover white-supremacist content, ... I click every recommendation. I follow every suggested follow. And within an hour, I have a corpus of data to work with” (Stanton, 2021). Essentially, the Internet presents the opportunity for radical groups to disseminate disinformation; social media provides a platform to share this message with larger audiences; and algorithms ensure that radical messages are reaching targeted audiences in order for radical groups to recruit new members.
The consequences of radicalization via social media in the United States were revealed through the January 6, 2021 domestic attack on the US Capitol and its aftermath. Donovan cites the January 6 Insurrection as a textbook example of radicalization through disinformation. The insurrectionists were encouraged by conspiracy theories spread on social media claiming that the results of the 2020 US presidential election were inaccurate, and the presidency was stolen from incumbent Donald Trump. Since the Insurrection, the US House Select Committee has been examining “how false claims about the 2020 election spread on platforms like Facebook and Twitter, including how algorithms might contribute to the promotion of disinformation and extremism” (Barret et al., 2021).
In Europe, online radicalization has spread through right-wing political parties. For example, the ideologies shared by Germany’s right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party were associated with the, the June 2019 murder of politician Walter Lȕbcke, the attempted October 2019 synagogue shooting in Halle, and the February 2020 Hanau shootings (McGuiness, 2021). While the AfD is not directly linked to these attacks, the perpetrators in each case were “radicalized by racist hate speech and far-right ideology online” (McGuiness, 2021). Germany is an interesting case because of its stringent laws against hate-speech. While AfD did not plan these attacks, its ability to spread right-wing ideologies through social media resulted in 13 deaths and 5 injuries in 9 months.
Section 3: Areas of Divergence Between Transatlantic Actors
Author: Clara Luque
It is important to remember that the EU itself does not bear the responsibility to fight terrorism or online radicalization; rather this task remains within the Member States, while the European Council establishes guidelines for them to follow. Nonetheless, the EU has developed tools focusing on the cross-border exchange of information, reinforcement of external border checks, the criminalization of terrorism financing and, particularly, the targeting of online radicalization (Russo, 2022). All these tools are important but need to bear in mind the importance of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, enshrined in article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Commission, 2017).
The EU has been emphasizing the need to enhance cooperation among states when it comes to efficiently tackling the terrorist threat after seeing its high impact in radicalization after the Belgian terrorist attacks in 2012. The European Commission finally identified online radicalization as one of the main roots of extremism and prepared the EU Internet Forum in November 2015 to tackle it coordinately. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the European Parliament initiated an own initiative resolution with proposals to face the terrorist threat in Europe that would be applied in particular in prisons, online and through education and social inclusion (European Commission, 2020).
These reports had to be updated and, as a result, the European Commission prepared a Counter-Terrorism Agenda in 2020– a non-binding document that aims to enhance inter-Member States cooperation in the larger scope of the EU’s Security Union Strategy. This will be carried out through, inter alia, the tackling of the core roots of radicalization, like the spread of radical ideologies online and in prisons, as well as the strengthening of Europol to cooperate with private parties and Member States (European Commission, 2020). In addition, in April 2021, a new Regulation on Addressing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online was approved in the European Parliament, a binding regulation of direct application in Member States that allows social media hosting services to remove certain posts and address the misuse of platforms when there is a threat of terrorist information dissemination (European Parliament, 2021). This was made possible because the regulation provides a definition of terrorist content ensuring respect of fundamental rights (European Union, 2021).
Online radicalization has seen an increase in the US and was finally brought to the spotlight after the Capitol incident at the beginning of 2021, giving rise to the latest updates on the responses to this topic like the United States National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (National Security Council, 2021). However, this phenomenon dates further back. The US considers that there is a very fine line between online radicalization and community engagement. The Department of Homeland Security, created after the September 11 Attacks, aims to tackle terrorism and targeted violence within US territory. In this department, the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) is focused on countering radicalization at its early stages and, potentially, preventing it. Every aspect of CP3’s activities have to consider and respect civil rights and liberties (Department of Homeland Security, 2022).
The Obama White House released in 2013 a policy statement on countering online recruitment, radicalization and violence due to extremist use of the Internet (The White House, 2013), after which several other initiatives took place. The policy statement recognized “raising awareness” as the main tool to tackle online radicalization, which would be carried out through the close collaboration with the tech industry to consider policies, technologies and tools that help counter violent extremism online without compromising civil liberties (The White House, 2013). From this idea stemmed the Countering Terrorists Exploitation of Social Media and the Internet
two-hour online course carried out by CP3 to educate online platforms on how individuals may use their media for radicalization processes (Department of Homeland Security, 2022). Unlike in the EU, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 protecting freedom of expression and innovation on the Internet, claims that social media platforms are not liable for the posts in their websites (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2021). This releases the pressure from social media companies, which most of the time decide to turn a blind eye to the most radical and viral posts.
The main difference identified between the US and EU’s approaches registered in their latest documents is who is given the ability to tackle the radical internet posts: in the EU, from July 2022, media hosts will have the responsibility to monitor and delete these posts within one hour of flagging them, whereas in the US it is up to the social media platform to establish where is the limit, based on educational programs provided to them for identifying and becoming more sensitive to these radicalization posts, such as through the endorsement of the Christchurch Call (Department of Homeland Security, 2022). Hence, the EU Strategy has a more extensive online regulation to tackle terrorist and violent extremist content because it prioritizes the content being posted rather the actor that enacts the posting (European Union, 2020). The Digital Services Act and the already mentioned Regulation 2021/784 are the tools allowing for the removal of posts (Leidig & van Mieghem, 2021).
Another key difference between the EU and US approach is the scope of the radicalization stage: the EU’s counter terrorism agenda does not explicitly mention far-right radicalization, even though it is tackled through the Radicalisation Awareness Network, but rather leaves it open to different roots (Leidig & van Mieghem, 2021); whereas the US’s approach explicitly targets far-right domestic terrorism (National Security Council, 2021). This is understood due to the different nature of the attacks perpetrated in US territory and within the EU: in the US the threat currently is mainly domestic violence due to extreme right ideologies, whereas in the EU the nature of the threats originates from international groups.
Finally, the last difference to be identified when facing online radicalization relates to the competences on the field (National Security Council, 2021): as discussed, the EU does not have exclusive competence but rather falls within the scope of Member States; whereas the US, as a sovereign state, highlights the role of the Department of Defense and Homeland Security when identifying and following the alerts of threats.
Section 4: Proposals to Address/Mitigate the Transatlantic Divergence
Author: Samuel Vandeputte
In order to address the main transatlantic divergence –the level of internet regulation– the EU and US should make use of different channels for cooperation. Three complimentary channels are NATO, EU-US executive cooperation, and parliamentary diplomacy.
First, the milestone 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda affirms NATO as the cornerstone of EU-US transatlantic security (NTA, 1995). As NATO considers cyber defense as part of its core tasks, it could be an ideal place for combating internet radicalization (NATO, 2021). While cyber security is on NATO’s radar more broadly, additional efforts should be made to focus on disinformation specifically in order to mitigate online radicalization. NATO can provide essential overarching security infrastructure through transatlantic agreements, such as the 2016 Cyber Security Pledge. In addition, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence’s mission could be expanded to include actively monitoring and fighting digital disinformation. Finally, NATO has a unique ability to increase cyber defense spending among its member states. Following the 2016 Cyber Security Pledge, a cyber expenditure rule could play a key role in establishing transatlantic coherence in the fight against online radicalization (Noyan, 2021).
A second venue for creating a greater level of transatlantic cyber security convergence is executive cooperation between the EU and US. At the heart of this is the EU-US Cyber Dialogue; the sixth and most recent session took place in 2019 (US DoS, 2019). Additionally, in recognition of the global scale of cybersecurity challenges, the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime intends to harmonize national laws across the globe. Currently signed by 67 states, the Convention can form the basis for the transatlantic alliance to align legislation, especially in creating a coherent framework for big tech companies to address disinformation.
Finally, parliamentary diplomacy between the European Parliament and US Congress also offers a venue for enhanced cooperation. Currently, counterrorism and cyber security are already among the most prominent topics discussed by the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (D-US, 2022). Transatlantic parliamentary dialogue should continue to aim at harmonizing cyber legislation as per the Budapest Convention, but more specifically devote attention to the role of cyber security in preventing online radicalization. Beyond coordinating the legislative dimension of the transatlantic approach to online radicalization, the EU-US parliamentary partnership can foster the cohesion of cyber security values between the peoples of Europe and the United States.
As Schuetze (2020) points out, despite stark differences in the EU and US cyber defense strategies, there are areas for cooperation and thus cause for optimism. The three venues for cooperation presented here are not exhaustive, but signify proposed pathways to transatlantic convergence to lead the global fight against online radicalization.
Section 5: Recommendations
Author: Benedikt Stöckl
Recommendation 1: Establish Joint Task Forces
Intelligence agencies such as the FBI and Europol could establish joint task-forces in order to engage in intelligence sharing and coordination in the field of counterterrorism, thereby increasing each agency's capability to respond to budding radicalization online. Such task-forces could be further elaborated upon across institutional levels through, for example, coordination between Europol and national intelligence agencies such as the BND in Germany.
Recommendation 2: Increase Cooperation with Social Media Platforms in the Establishment of ‘Counter Narratives’
As Langer et al. (2019) point out, so-called ‘counter narratives’ have become more and more important in the fight against online radicalization. These ‘counter narratives’ aim to juxtapose
content perceived as ‘extremist’ with counter arguments in an attempt to defuse the impact of radical content online. As such, social media platforms could be called upon to amplify their diffusion of ‘counter narratives’, which would be coordinated according to the specific threat at hand (i.e. right-wing extremism, Islamic terrorism, etc.) throughout the US and EU member states.
Recommendation 3: Advance Dialogue Using (Existing) Transatlantic Platforms
Conferences such as the Parliamentary Conference on Combating International Terrorism within the OSCE framework (OSCE, 2017) or the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue between the European Parliament and US Congress have demonstrated the increased willingness to use multinational platforms in the discussion of issues relating to counterterrorism. Such formats should be fortified and enhanced. Furthermore, similar formats, potentially tailored to correspond to Transatlantic issues, could be created in order to calibrate Transatlantic efforts in combating terrorism and online radicalization. Building on parliamentary diplomacy between the EU and the US, such conferences could include state and private actors from the EU and the US (e.g. intelligence agencies, representatives of social media platforms, Members of the European Parliament/US Congress, the Council of the EU in its Justice and Home Affairs Council, etc.) and be a platform to discuss challenges, developments and perspectives concerning Transatlantic efforts to counter radicalization. On top of being a vehicle of intelligence sharing, such conferences would also have a significant symbolic effect.
Recommendation 4: Coordinate Rules on Cyber Defense Spending to Combat Online Radicalization throughout NATO
As aforementioned, NATO serves as the main cornerstone of Transatlantic Security, also dedicating itself to the cyber security of member states. Given the fact that online radicalization poses a problem for every member state involved, a joint accord on defense expenditure, aiming specifically to combat online radicalization, might help to coordinate member states’ efforts and ensure each member states’ commitment to the issue. An investment guideline dedicated to combating online radicalization could help in that regard. Furthermore, increased defense expenditure could be used in order to fund joint projects involving members of the ‘Partnership for Peace’, the ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ and the ‘Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’. These projects could be aimed at enhancing and fortifying efforts to combat online radicalization in the involved countries, thus further mitigating the effects of online radicalization beyond the confines of the Transatlantic Community.
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